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NOTES
THE PowER op FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY CoTRTs To ENJOIN STATE
PROCEEDINGS AS AN INCIDENT OF DISCHARGE
One of the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is "to relieve the
honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit
him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities
consequent upon business misfortunes." 1 To effect such a goal,
the Act provides for the requisite statutory machinery.
For
example, federal courts are empowered to "discharge or refuse to
discharge bankrupts . .. " 2 A discharge is defined as a release
from all provable debts, 3 but certain types of debts, such as those
represented by judgments for willful or malicious injuries or
debts which have not been properly scheduled in the bankruptcy4
proceeding, are expressly denied the benefit of the discharge.
With this statutory foundation in mind, the effect of the
discharge decree should be examined. It is a personal defense
that may be utilized by a bankrupt in any action on a discharged
debt.5 The effect of the discharge decree, as distinguished from
the right thereto which is passed on by a federal court, is determined by the court in which it is interposed as a defense. 6
This forum is usually a state
court.7 This "right-effect" distinction
8
has been made traditionally.
As far as a creditor's conduct is concerned, federal case
law reveals that there are many paths which he may pursue. A
creditor is under no duty to appear in a bankruptcy proceeding. 9
Having appeared in the bankruptcy proceeding and accepted partial
1 Williams v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55
(1915).
2 30 Stat. 545 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § Il(a)(12) (1958).
330 Stat. 544 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 1(15) (1958).
430 Stat. 550 (1898), 11 U.S.C. §35(a) (1958).
5In re Innis, 140 F.2d 479, 481 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 736
(1944) ; Aiken v. Bank of Georgia, 101 Ga. App. 200, 113 S.E.2d 405 (1960).
6 Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 611, 623-24 (1849) ; Milando v. Perrone, 157 F2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1946); 1 CoLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1698 (14th ed.

1962).7

First Discount Corp. v. Applegate, 104 Ohio App. 84, 143 N.E.2d 868
(1957).
8
1n re Marshall Paper Co., 102 Fed. 872, 874 (1st Cir. 1900).
9 Personal Industrial Loan Corp. v. Forgay, 240 F.2d 18, 20 (10th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 922 (1957); 1 CoLLiER, op. cit. supra note 6,

at 1700.
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payment of his claim, a creditor may still sue on the balance
of the debt in a state court and have that forum decide whether
his claim was discharged by the decree. 10 Moreover, a creditor's
appearance in the federal bankruptcy court does not give the
bankrupt the benefit of the defense of res judicata in any subsequent state action."
In derogation of the general rule that a state court passes
on the dischargeability of a specific debt, Local Loan Co. v.
Hunt' 2 held that a federal court can, under "unusual circumstances," enjoin the creditor from initiating a state proceeding
which would decide whether or not his claim had been discharged
by the bankruptcy decree. It will be the purpose of this note
to examine the manner in which federal courts have applied the
test enunciated in that case, and to analyze certain instances where
it would be fruitless for a bankrupt to petition for an injunction
based on Local Loan.
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt
In order to appreciate the significance of this case, one must
realize that prior to Local Loan, federal courts operated on the
theory that their contact with the bankrupt was terminated with
the discharge decree.' 3 In Local Loan, Hunt, as security for a
loan, executed an assignment of his future wages. Two years
later he was adjudged bankrupt. His creditor instituted an
action in an Illinois state court to compel Hunt's employer to
comply with the wage assignment. Hunt found himself in a
difficult position. This was so because the Illinois lower courts
had uniformly held that a wage assignment was nondischargeable.
Although the state's highest court had not passed on the question,
it seemed clear that if he defended on the merits, the decision
would certainly be adverse. Hence, in order to protect the advantage of his discharge decree, he would then have to resort
to a costly appeal. Rather than incur this expense, which would
be great in proportion to the amount in controversy, Hunt petitioned
the federal district court to enjoin the creditor from prosecuting
10 Friend v. Talcott, 228 U.S. 27 (1913) ; Bates, The Practitionerand the
Bankruptcy Process, 15 VAImD. L. Rv. 1, 8 (1961).
11Friend v. Talcott, supra note 10; cf. Meier Credit Co. v. Yeo, 129

N.J.L. 82, 28 A.2d 227 (1942).

12292 U.S. 234 (1934).
13 In re Havens, 272 Fed. 975 (2d Cir. 1921); In re Boardway, 248 Fed.
364 (N.D.N.Y. 1918). However, two decisions prior to Local Loan indicated
that a federal court would enjoin a state action so that the general purpose
of the Bankruptcy Act might not be thwarted. In re Skorcz, 67 F.2d 187 (7th
Cir. 1933); Seaboard Small Loan Corp. v. Ottinger, 50 F2d 856 (4th Cir.

1931).
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the state action. The injunction was issued, and the Supreme
Court upheld its issuance.
However, the rationale of the Court presented a problem.
The Court premised its argument on the fact that a bankruptcy
court is essentially a court of equity. Since courts of equity have
authority to issue decrees supplemental to an original decree (in
this instance, a discharge in bankruptcy), the Supreme Court
concluded that the federal district court had the power to issue
the injunction. Next, the Court had to formulate some test which
could be employed- to determine under what circumstances an
injunction should be issued. The Court declared: "[T]he court
was [not] bound to exercise its authority. And it probably would
not and should not have done so except under unusual circumstances such as here exist." 14
The nature of these "unusual circumstances" is a question that
has plagued federal courts whenever they have been petitioned
to issue an injunction on the basis of Local Loan. Although the
Court in Local Loan relied to a large extent on the element of
excessive expense, it would be inaccurate to conclude that this
factor alone warrants a Local Loan type of injunction.
In
Csatari v. General Fin. Corp.'5 the bankrupt was financially unable
to post an.appeal bond as required by state statute. He petitioned
the federal district court for injunction on the theory that the
necessity of the bond was an "unusual circumstance" that warranted
injunctive relief. His petition was denied on the theory that such
a requirement was reasonable.
Res Judicata
At times, the principle of res judicata may weigh against the
issuance of an injunction. 16 In Walters v. Wilson,17 the creditor
obtained a state judgment prior to the debtor's discharge in bankruptcy. The debtor appeared in the state court to have the garnishment decree vacated by reason of his bankruptcy discharge.
The superior and district courts of California decided in favor
of the bankrupt. But, the Supreme Court of that state reversed.
The bankrupt petitioned the federal court for an injunction prohibiting execution, alleging that loss of employment might result.
The court denied the injunction because the principle of res judicata
would be violated by relitigating the issue of dischargeability.38
14Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 241 (1934).
15 173 F.2d 798 (6th Cir. 1949).
16 Otte v. Cooks, Inc., 113 F. Sapp. 861 (D. Minn. 1953).
17142 F.2d 59 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 722 (1944); see In re
Johnson, 211 F. Supp. 337 (D.N.J. 1962).
18Accord, In re Devereaux, 76 F.2d 522 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S.
589 (1935); In re Grover, 63 F. Supp. 644 (D. Minn. 1945).
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A different situation can occur when the bankrupt does not plead
his discharge in a state action, but defends on another ground
and is unsuccessful. Res judicata would likewise prompt a federal
court to deny the bankrupt's petition for injunctive relief where
he designates this other ground as an "unusual circumstance." 10
Hence, courts seem reluctant to find "unusual circumstances" whenever the principle of res judicata would be threatened by such
a determination.
Default Judgment
Many bankrupts erroneously believe that a discharge extinguishes their debt.2 0 In Helms v. Holmes,21 the bankrupt,
thinking that his discharge acted as an automatic defense, failed to
defend a state action instituted by his creditor. The creditor
obtained a default judgment, and then sought to execute it by
having the sheriff levy on the bankrupt's property. The bankrupt
then petitioned the district court for an injunction, which was
granted. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the bankrupt was not entitled to equitable relief because he did not appear
in the state action and plead his defense of bankruptcy.22 In
effect, the court seemed to imply that ignorance is not an "unusual
circumstance" that demands injunctive relief.
Having considered the problem of a state default judgment
subsequent to discharge, let us examine the reverse, that is, where
the default judgment occurs prior to discharge. Although courts
will not enjoin the execution of a state judgment obtained subsequent to discharge, there is some authority for the proposition
that a court will enjoin execution on a default judgment rendered
prior to discharge. 23 However, it should be noted that the prior
default judgment might represent a cause of action which is
dischargeable on its face, or one which might be exempted from
19 In re Harris, 28 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Ill.
1939).
Stevenson, Protecting the Bankrupt, 30 OKLA. B.J. 902, 903 (1959). This
situation is described in the dissenting opinion in Helms v. Holmes, 129 F.2d
263 (5th Cir. 1942), where judge Paul states: "[T]he average bankrupt is a
layman who has been advised that a discharge in bankruptcy releases him....
It has become a custom for greedy creditors to take advantage of this situation by ignoring the bankruptcy proceedings . . . and suing on their debts in
the state courts, hoping that the bankrupt, because of his ignorance . . . will
fail to appear and plead the discharge. . . ." Id. at 269 (dissenting opinion).
21 129 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1942).
22
Accord, In re Innis, 140 F.2d 479 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 736
(1944) ; Household Fin. Corp. v. Dunbar, 262 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1958).
23 In the Matter of Forgay, 140 F. Supp. 473 (D. Utah),'aff'd Sub nora.
Personal Industrial Loan Corp. v. Forgay, 240 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 354 U.S. 922 (1957); In re Tillery, 16 F. Supp. 877 (N.D.
Ga. 1936).
20
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discharge by the terms of the bankruptcy act; that is, which might
be nondischargeable.
With respect to the former, In the Matter of Forgay 24 involved
a situation where the creditor's state action was dischargeable on its
face, and was reduced to judgment during the debtor's bankruptcy
proceeding but prior to his discharge. This case held that a
federal court will enjoin the execution of such a prior state default
judgment, providing the creditor's claim was properly scheduled,
and the creditor had actual notice of the bankruptcy proceeding.
The district judge postulated that the power to grant such
injunctive relief is discretionary. He then proceeded to condemn
loan companies for completely disregarding bankruptcy proceedings
in favor of a state court where the likelihood of a default judgment, that avoids "a searching inquiry into the facts," 25 is great.
Believing this to be the conduct of the loan company, he granted
the injunction in the hope that it would curb such behavior
which makes a mockery of the Bankruptcy Act.
On the other hand, where the prior default judgment is for
some cause of action which might not be dischargeable on its face,
the creditor will invariably contest the bankrupt's injunction proceeding on that ground. Now, the federal court must decide
whether the standard used in the state court meets the exemption
requirements of the Bankruptcy Act. In re Tillery 26 presented
a situation where the bankrupt had a judgment rendered against
him for "deliberate negligence." Thereafter, he procured a bankruptcy decree, listing this judgment as a debt. When the judgment creditor attempted to execute it, the bankrupt petitioned the
bankruptcy court for an injunction, alleging harassment as the
"unusual circumstance."
The judgment creditor answered by
claiming that the state judgment was a debt based on a willful
or malicious injury, and thereby exempt from the discharge as
provided by the Bankruptcy Act.2 7 The district court, in granting
the injunction, held that "deliberate negligence" was not within
the statutory exemption. However, in Harrison v. Donnelly,2
the district court held that a state judgment for "wanton and
reckless conduct" did meet the statutory standard and was, therefore, exempt from the discharge. Thus, when the federal court
is presented with a prior default judgment, it may have to look
behind the judgment in order to arrive at its own independent
determination as to whether or not the creditor's claim is dischargeable, before it can enjoin.
24

In the Matter of Forgay, supra note 23.

25 Id. at 477.
2

GSupra note 23.
2730 Stat 550 (1898), 11 U.S.C. §35(a) (1958).
28 153 F2d 588 (8th Cir. 1946).
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Unusual Circumstances

Having analyzed the problem of res judicata and default
judgments, reference should now be made to the cases defining the
nature of "unusual circumstances." A bankrupt may find himself
in a situation in which he seeks an injunction because his remedy
in the state courts "involves trouble, embarrassment, expense, and
possible loss of employment." 29 Courts have characterized the
following as unusual circumstances that warrant injunctive relief:
excessive expense of appeal in the state courts, 30 the charging of
a usurious rate of interest, 31 the lack of expertise on the part of a
state court,32 and the possible loss of employment due to the harass3
ment of the bankrupt's employer through garnishment proceedings.
34
However, in Poolman v. Poolman, the bankrupt executed a
separation agreement with his wife whereby he was to pay $50 a
week for her support. Upon his default, she obtained a judgment
for the money she had to borrow when he failed to meet the
payments. Thereafter, the husband had himself declared a bankrupt. When his wife jeopardized his employment by attempting to
collect the judgment, he petitioned for and was granted an injunction. The Court of Appeals reversed on the theory that the
state judgment debt was of a nondischargeable nature, and therefore, the bankrupt was not entitled to injunctive relief. The
decision indicates that the mere existence of an unusual circumstance does not entitle a bankrupt to equitable relief where the
debt is nondischargeable in the first instance.
Some Recent Views Concerning Local Loan

There is the hope among some writers that injunctions will
be granted more liberally in this area.3 5 In opposition to this
is the attitude expressed by the following: "Local Loan Co. v.
Hunt has been interpreted to mean that . . . ancillary jurisdiction

is exceedingly narrow, to be exercised only 'under unusual cir-

29 Seaboard Small Loan Corp. v. Ottinger, 50 F.2d 856, 859 (4th Cir. 1931).
30 In re Connors, 93 F. Supp. 149 (N.D. Ind. 1950).
31
ln re Taylor, 29 F. Supp. 656 (Y.D. Ga. 1939).
32 State Fin. Co. v. Morrow, 216 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1954).
33
1n re Caldwell, 33 F. Supp. 631 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd sub nora. DavisonPaxon Co. v. Caldwell, 115 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S.
564 (1941); cf. Gore v. Gorman's Inc., 143 F. Supp. 9 (W.D. Mo. 1956),
where an action for malicious prosecution was allowed when a creditor's
continual harassment threatened bankrupt's chance for steady employment.
34289 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1961).
35 Moore, Res .udicata and Collateral Estoppel in Bankruptcy, 68 YALE
L.J. 1, 26-27 (1958) ; Smedley, Determination of the Effect of a Discharge in
Bankruptcy, 15 VAND. L. RE.v. 49, 82 (1961).
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cumstances.'" 36 In the recent case of Briskin v. White,3 7 the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit appears to have adopted
the latter approach. It interprets "unusual circumstances" to mean
38
the existence of state law adverse to the position of the bankrupt,
as was the case in Local Loan. Hence, by implication, the court
rejects the other traditional types of "unusual circumstances." 39
Proposed Legislation
In order to remedy this problem, there has been a steady
40
The Celler Bill, 4 1
movement to amend the Bankruptcy Act.
the predecessor of the latest attempts to allow the bankruptcy
court to determine the effect of its own decree, provides that
a bankruptcy court should determine the dischargeability or nondischargeability of all provable debts. There is a divergence of
opinion as to the utility of such an innovation. Its proponents
argue that it "will correct a serious defect in the Act and add
to the dignity of the bankruptcy court by requiring it to vindicate
its own decrees,"' 42 and that the court's "determination would
not only be quick but final, it would be 'one stop' res adjudicata."43
On the other hand, its opponents contend that the amendment
would delay bankruptcy procedure because the court would have
to consider discharge controversies, for example, whether or not
a tort was willful or malicious and therefore a nondischargeable
debt. 44 Additionally, it is suggested that it would be an unwise
federal usurpation of an area that has traditionally been thought
to be within the state's jurisdiction, that the cost to the federal
government of providing more facilities would be prohibitive, and
that there is no reason to assume that a federal court would be
dischargeability of a debt since
more qualified to determine the
45
it would be applying state law.
Remedies Other Than a Local Loan Injunction
In certain cases, where the bankrupt still has some other
remedy available, federal courts have refused to issue an injunction,
36 Ciavarella v. Salituri, 153 F.2d 343, 344 (2d Cir. 1946).
37296 F.2d 132 (9th Cir. 1961).
38
Id. at 134.
39 Herzog, Bankruptcy Law-Modern Trends, 35 REF. J. 87, 89 (1962).
40 H.R. 11543, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956); H.R. 106, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1957) ; H.R. 4150, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) ; H.R. 1742, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1961).
41 H.R. 106, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
42 Herzog, snpra note 39, at 90.
43 Friebolin, Want to Make a Federal Case of It?, 62 Co,. L.J. 249, 250
(1957).
44 Smedley, supra note 35.
45 Friebolin, sufpra note 43.
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and have expressly advised the bankrupt to pursue this other
course of action first.46 The two most notable remedies are:
pleading the discharge as a personal defense (absent a Local Loan
type situation), and utilizing a state cancellation statute if the
jurisdiction has such a statute.
With respect to the first, the discharge is a personal defense7
to any state action by a creditor, i. e., waived if not pleaded
Once the discharge decree has been introduced into evidence, the
burden of proof is on the creditor to demonstrate why his specific
claim is exempt from discharge. 48 Of course, if the bankrupt
believes that the state court has erroneously decided the question
of dischargeability, he49may ultimately appeal to the Supreme Court
of the United States.
Some jurisdictions have enacted statutes that provide a bankrupt with an inexpensive remedy for having a creditor's judgment
cancelled. 0 For example, Section 150 of the New York Debtor
and Creditor Law allows a bankrupt to petition the court that
rendered a judgment against him for the purpose of having it
cancelled on the' basis of his discharge decree. If that court
decides that the debt upon which the judgment was based was
dischargeable, the judgment will be cancelled.
Under this type of legislation, there are three possible situations
that might arise: (1) the state judgment may have been obtained
prior to discharge; (2) the state judgment may have been rendered
subsequent to discharge and may have been taken by default; or
(3) the judgment may have been obtained subsequent to discharge
with the bankrupt having appeared and defended. If the judgment
was rendered prior to discharge, section 150 clearly applies since
the question of discharsyeability could never have been considered
by the state court.5 When there is a default judgment subsequent
to discharge, the bankrupt may still take advantage of the cancellation statute, despite the fact that he did not appear in the2
state action and plead his discharge. In Rukeyser v. Tostezin,
the bankruot listed the creditor's debt in the bankruptcy proceeding. Subsequent to his discharge, the creditor obtained a
46

Gatbany v. Bishopp, 177 F.2d 567 (4th Cir. 1949) ; In re Innis, 140 F.2d
479 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 736 (1944); In re Stoller, 25 F. Supp.

22647(S.D.N.Y. 1938).

Household Fin. Corp. v. Dunbar, 262 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1958).
Whelan v. United States Guar. Co., 252 F.2d 851 (D.C. Cir. 1958);
Fin. Co. v. Valdez, 11 Utah 2d 339, 359 P.2d 9 (1961).
National
49
1n re Devereaux, 76 F.2d 522, 524 (2d Cir. 1935).
50
See, e.g., N.Y. DEBr. & CRED. LAw § 150; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.18
N.D. REv. CoDE §28-20-30 (1943).
(1945);
51
Rukeyser v. Tostevin, 188 App. Div. 629, 631, 177 N.Y. Supp. 291, 292
(1st Dep't 1919); Multiple Trading Corp. v. Berta Saggese-Edilizia, Inc.,
178 52Misc. 1077, 37 N.Y.S.2d 296 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
Supra note 51.
48
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default judgment on the listed debt. The bankrupt petitioned
that court under the cancellation statute and the judgment was
cancelled. As to the third possibility, although no case law has
been found, it would seem that if the bankrupt has appeared in a
subsequent state action, the doctrine of res judicata would prevent
him from utilizing the statute.
Conclusion
Varied solutions to the problem of what constitutes an "unusual
circumstance" have been advanced. For some, proposed legislation
provides the answer. Others believe 'that the Supreme Court
should grant certiorari to the proper case in an effort to redefine
the test with more precision. Yet, it should be borne in mind
that the bankruptcy court, as a court of equity, requires a certain
flexibility, lest the equitable remedy become frozen. The present
test seems to provide that degree of elasticity necessary for a court
of equity to grant relief when the remedy at law is inadequate
and, perhaps, should not be so readily abandoned. Most of the
problems that arise in this area could be averted if the attorney
who represents the bankrupt in the bankruptcy proceeding would
advise him as to the effect of his discharge.

X
THE CHANGING APPROACH TO

"TRIAL

By

NEwsPAPER"

One of the basic rights guaranteed by our Constitution is
that one accused of a crime be afforded a fair trial by an impartial
jury. This guarantee is made applicable to state prosecutions by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.' An essential
ingredient of that right is that an accused be tried by jurors whose
verdict is based solely upon a consideration of competent evidence
received in open court.2 However, as the incidence of crime
reporting has increased, 3 it has become difficult to empanel jurors
who have not read something of the case. Often, the publicity4
to which they have been exposed will be extremely prejudicial.
I In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,
266-73 (1948).
2 People v. Sprague, 217 N.Y. 373, 380, 111 N.E. 1077, 1080 (1916).
3 In discussing the amount lof publicity attendant to a particular trial
one writer commented that there Were "Words enough, if put into book form,
to make a shelf of novels 22 feet long." BARNES & TErrERs, NEW HoRIzoNs
IN CRIMINOLOGY, 192, 193 (2d ed. 1951).
4 For a discussion of the type of publicity that precedes a sensational
TRIAL By NEWSPAPER (1961); Issacs, The Crime of
trial see SULLrvA,
Present Day Crime Reporting, 52 J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 405 (1961).

